/cs:caio-review <plan> — Eval-demanding Chief AI Officer interrogation of any plan that involves AI: model selection, risk classification, cost economics, or AI hiring. Use when shipping an AI feature without an eval set, choosing between API, fine-tune, and self-hosted, or classifying a use case under the EU AI Act.
Command: /cs:caio-review <plan>
The eval-demanding CAIO pressure-tests any plan that involves AI. Six questions before any AI feature ships, any multi-year vendor commitment, or any AI team expansion.
No eval set = no ship. Before any AI feature deploys, define the eval criteria.
Every AI feature has a failure mode. Plan for it.
Run ai_risk_classifier.py if any EU residents are affected OR domain is regulated.
Run model_buildvsbuy_calculator.py for the specific use case.
Run ai_cost_economics.py for the workload.
Map AI capability to specific role. Founders confuse AI engineer / ML engineer / research scientist.
# 1. Model selection check
python ../../../c-level-advisor/skills/chief-ai-officer-advisor/scripts/model_buildvsbuy_calculator.py use_case.json
# 2. Regulatory classification
python ../../../c-level-advisor/skills/chief-ai-officer-advisor/scripts/ai_risk_classifier.py use_case.json
# 3. Cost projection
python ../../../c-level-advisor/skills/chief-ai-officer-advisor/scripts/ai_cost_economics.py workload.json
# CAIO Review: <plan>
**Date:** YYYY-MM-DD
## The Decision Being Made
[one sentence — which CAIO decision: model selection | risk classification | economics | next hire]
## Eval Discipline
- Eval set committed: yes/no
- SLO defined: <metric> < <threshold>
- Fallback behavior: <one line>
## Model Selection (if applicable)
- Recommended: API / FINE_TUNE / BUILD
- 3-year TCO: $X (chosen path) vs $Y (alternatives)
- Breakeven: <volume>
## Risk Classification (if applicable)
- EU AI Act tier: PROHIBITED / HIGH / LIMITED / MINIMAL
- Conformity assessment required: yes/no
- US state triggers: [list]
- Required controls open: N
## Cost Economics (if applicable)
- Monthly cost at current volume: $X
- Breakeven for self-hosted migration: <volume>
- Migration cost if applicable: $X (3-6 months)
## Org (if applicable)
- Next hire: <role>
- Why this, not the alternative: <one line>
- Prerequisite hires in place: yes/no
## Verdict
🟢 SHIP | 🟡 SHARPEN | 🔴 BLOCK
## Next Steps
[3 concrete actions]
/cs:cdo-review — for any training-data implications/cs:gc-review — for AI vendor contracts, output liability, training-data licensing/cs:ciso-review — for prompt injection / jailbreak / training-data poisoning threat model/cs:cfo-review — for multi-year vendor or GPU commitment TCOcs-chro-advisor agent — for AI team hires (comp, ladder, leveling)/cs:decide — log the verdict/cs:freeze 60 — on multi-year AI commitmentscs-caio-advisorchief-ai-officer-advisor../../../c-level-advisor/skills/chief-data-officer-advisor/ (training data rights, data strategy)Version: 1.0.0
Copy a source-pinned command for your client. You run it yourself.
Destination: .claude/skills/caio-review · pinned to the source commit
# Run from your project root
git clone https://github.com/alirezarezvani/claude-skills.git .skillboard-tmp
git -C .skillboard-tmp checkout 19392f7a08264ed00486a251f5b2098321771f94
mkdir -p ".claude/skills"
cp -r ".skillboard-tmp/.gemini/skills/caio-review" ".claude/skills/"
rm -rf .skillboard-tmpReview the source before running. This copies files into your project; it is not a one-click install and does not verify runtime safety.
sudo apt update && sudo apt install -y gitnpm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code# Run from your project root
git clone https://github.com/alirezarezvani/claude-skills.git .skillboard-tmp
git -C .skillboard-tmp checkout 19392f7a08264ed00486a251f5b2098321771f94
mkdir -p ".claude/skills"
cp -r ".skillboard-tmp/.gemini/skills/caio-review" ".claude/skills/"
rm -rf .skillboard-tmpDestination: .claude/skills/caio-review
Scanner static-checks@0.1.0 · commit 19392f7a0826. Static checks cannot prove runtime safety – review the source and the exact diff before installing. How checks work.
Uses encoding/eval patterns that can hide executable content.
Evidence: [redacted]· fingerprint 1bbd174404efbce9
References parent-directory traversal, which can escape a target directory.
Evidence: ../· fingerprint fa08499e14d0113b